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LITIGATION ON BEHALF OF THE
HOMELESS: SYSTEMATIC APPROACHES
GARY L. BLASI*
This article will leave to others the discussion of whether Americans
have a "right to shelter" arising under the Constitution. What con-
cerns practicing poverty lawyers are not matters of abstract right, but
the daily desperate existence of individual homeless clients and the
forces at work in society that lead to homelessness. This is not to say
that the question of a "right to shelter" is not an important issue.
American society will eventually answer the question of which the
"right to shelter" is but a part: Do people have a right to life simply by
reason of their humanity or citizenship? Put another way, shall we
permit people to freeze to death in the winter, to starve, to die from the
effects of preventable disease, merely because they are poor, insane, or
addicted to drugs? In the long run, the ways in which our society re-
sponds to that fundamental question will determine far more than the
plight of the homeless. It will define our civilization.
In the short run, however, both the homeless and their advocates
must deal with the concrete problems of obtaining shelter. Advocacy
can only succeed if based on an objective and empirical understanding
of the systems and institutions that place people on the streets and keep
them there. Homelessness as a social phenomenon is clearly related to
the loss of low income housing, drastically increased "structural" un-
employment, and the failure of the mental health system. At both the
federal level and the state level a complex array of "social safety net"
programs exists. The very existence of these programs would seem-
ingly render homelessness impossible. The homelessness of large num-
* Special Projects Attorney, Legal Aid Foundation of Los Angeles.
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bers of people, however, can often be traced directly to one or more
holes in the "social safety net." Governments have intentionally cre-
ated some of these "holes" in order to achieve other goals, like control-
ling costs. Although the examples used in this article are primarily
from Los Angeles, conversations with advocates across the country
suggest that the processes at work in Los Angeles are nearly universal.
Litigation on behalf of the homeless in Los Angeles County has been
conducted by a "Homeless Litigation Team," comprised of lawyers
and legal workers from eight public interest law firms' and by an occa-
sional private law firm's pro bono contributions.2 In Los Angeles
County, state law obligates the county to "relieve and support" the
indigent and disabled who are not otherwise supported,' an obligation
the county meets by means of a general assistance program known as
General Relief. In the early stages of looking at the legal aspects of
homelessness, a seeming contradiction struck these advocates. An
emergency shelter system existed as part of the General Relief pro-
gram. This system ostensibly provided hotel vouchers to any homeless
applicant who needed assistance. While thousands of people lived in
the alleys, streets, and parts of Los Angeles, hundreds of vacant rooms
existed in the county's voucher hotel system. Through interviews with
dozens of homeless people in the welfare office, some of the reasons for
the contradiction became obvious. The local welfare bureaucracy had
constructed two simple but effective barriers to the shelter system that
served to control the flow of homeless persons into the emergency shel-
ter system and, therefore, into the General Relief system itself.
The first of these barriers was an arbitrarily stringent documentary
identification requirement. A homeless person applying for emergency
shelter was required to produce a certified copy of a birth certificate or
a drivers license. A fact of life on the streets is that people tend to keep
their identification with their valuables, and both are frequently lost to
thieves. The identification requirements, therefore, kept many people
on the streets. An intermediate level welfare bureaucrat revealed that
the requirements varied with the seasons; in the winter when demand
1. Legal Aid Foundation of Los Angeles, American Civil Liberties Union Founda-
tion, Western Center on Law and Poverty, Inner City Law Center, Mental Health Ad-
vocacy Services, Center for Law in the Public Interest, Protection and Advocacy, Inc.,
and San Fernando Valley Neighborhood Legal Services.
2. Several major law firms, including Irell and Mannella; Donovan, Leisure,
Newton and Irvine; and Munger, Tolles and Olson, have made important contributions.
3. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 17,000 (Deering 1985).
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was high, the county insisted on birth certificates. In the summer,
lesser forms of identification might suffice.
The second barrier was simpler, but no less effective. Some welfare
offices established quotas for the number of homeless people they
would assist. People who came in after the quota was full, no matter
how desperate their situation, were told to return at a later date. Both
of these practices were ended by a temporary restraining order in
Eisenheim v. Board of Supervisors,4 the first case brought by the Home-
less Litigation Team.
The identification and appointment systems utilized by the Los An-
geles County Department of Public Social Services are typical of the
bureaucratic devices that government agencies impose in order to
achieve organizational goals. These goals include controlling the ap-
proved caseload and, ultimately, adhering to the budgetary bottom line
established by political decision makers. If one thinks of welfare sys-
tems such as the general assistance program in Los Angeles County as
"systems" in the generic sense,5 one can analyze them empirically and
objectively, despite the fact that the "throughput" involved is human
life. Viewed in this way, the regulations enjoined in Eisenheim are "in-
put control," regulating the flow of homeless peoples into the county
welfare apparatus. Though this coldhearted analysis may offend the
sensibilities of those charged with advocating the human rights of the
poor, it is exactly the kind of analysis that leads bureaucrats and politi-
cians to make the decisions that advocacy litigation seeks to reverse.
There are several other kinds of "input controls" that have drastic
consequences for homeless people. Perhaps the most Kafkaesque is the
requirement that one must have an address in order to receive benefits.
Such a regulation presents an almost classic Catch-22 for the homeless
poor. In order to receive an income, one must have an address. In
order to pay rent to establish an address, one must have an income.
Courts have at times struck down these regulations;6 at other times
they have upheld them as necessary to control fraud.7 The Alice-in-
Wonderland character of these regulations makes them an appealing
target for litigation. Advocates of the rights of the homeless consid-
ered challenging the address requirement of the General Relief pro-
4. No. C47953 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. December 20, 1983).
5. See, e.g., C. WEST CHURCHMAN, THE SYSTEMS APPROACH (1979).
6. Martin v. Milwaukee County, No. 656-770 (Milwaukee County Cir. Ct. January
9, 1985).
7. See, e.g., Adkins v. Leach, 17 Cal. App. 3d 771, 95 Cal. Rptr. 61 (1971).
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gram in Los Angeles County. Investigation of welfare statistics
revealed, however, that the county rarely denied assistance to homeless
people just because they lacked an address. An address would, in fact,
result from the referral of the homeless person to one of the county's
skid row hotels. Litigation focused on this regulation might have been
intellectually interesting, but would have had neither an effect on the
streets nor a measurable benefit for homeless people. Scarce advocacy
resources must be targeted toward meaningful ends, based not upon an
a priori supposition, but upon a solid factual analysis of the systems
causing the harm.
Other "input controls" should be analyzed in the course of develop-
ing a litigation strategy for homeless people. Some can be determined
only by spending days in the welfare office, observing the process as it
exists in reality, as distinguished from the process that regulations de-
scribe. Perhaps the most insidious input control is the complexity of
the application and intake process itself. There is no concensus on the
percentages of the homeless population who are mentally disabled,
although a greatly disproportionate number of the homeless suffer
from mental illness.8 It is equally clear that the application process
required to obtain even emergency shelter is often so complex and chal-
lenging that individuals with any significant mental impairment have
little chance of successfully completing the process. This complexity is
often intentional. In Los Angeles, a high ranking welfare official ad-
mitted that the "welfare application process ... was designed to be
rough. It is designed quite frankly to be exclusionary." 9 Whether by
design or not, the application process may present to a mentally dis-
abled homeless person as insurmountable an obstacle as does a stair-
way to a paraplegic. Because local governments often use federal funds
to support the welfare system, such barriers may violate section 504 of
the Federal Rehabilitation Act of 197310 or similar state laws. 1
Another "input control" arises, paradoxically, from the emergency
8. See, e.g., Arce, Identifying and Characterizing the Mentally III Among the Home-
less, in THE HOMELESS MENTALLY ILL (H. R. Lamb ed. 1984).
9. Address by Robert Chaffee, Director of Bureau of Assistance Payments, Los An-
geles County Department of Public Social Services, to Los Angeles Countywide Coali-
tion on the Homeless (Oct. 9, 1984).
10. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982). The Rehabilitation Act prohibits discrimination against
the handicapped.
11. An action challenging the discriminatory impact of the General Relief applica-
tion process on the mentally disabled is currently pending in the Los Angeles County
Superior Court: Rensch v. Board of Supervisors, No. C595155.
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shelter itself. If the emergency shelter is dangerous, dirty, and degrad-
ing to homeless people, they will make a rational decision to remain on
the streets. Thus, in a very practical sense, a 'shelter' that does not
meet minimal standards of cleanliness, warmth, space and rudimentary
conveniences is no shelter at all.12
Homeless parents may choose to remain on the streets with their
children rather than subject them to life in a dormitory-style shelter
housing an undifferentiated population of homeless adults. Indigent
individuals may forego assistance rather than give up their privacy in a
county-sponsored poorhouse.13 In Los Angeles, the Homeless Litiga-
tion Team, after obtaining court orders mandating provisions for shel-
ter, found that their clients refused to use vouchers for skid row hotels.
The homeless clients felt that the hotels were more dangerous and un-
sanitary than the parks and alleys to which they had access.
14
Despite the relative effectiveness of the "input controls," some
homeless people succeed in obtaining benefits. In Los Angeles County,
for example, each month approximately 5,000 homeless people seek
emergency assistance from the county. Of these, about 40% will even-
tually qualify for general assistance. In order to control the budget of
the welfare department, then, the bureaucracy must devise a means of
insuring that people do not remain indefinitely on the welfare roles.
This is not necessarily an inhumane goal. If a general assistance pro-
gram serves as a "bridge" to income maintenance programs for the
disabled, like Supplemental Security Income, or as a source of support
for the employable young person while he or she finds work, the pro-
gram is working as most people believe it should. Unfortunately, it
costs more to achieve these worthy goals than to terminate recipients
for little or no reason. Thus, in Los Angeles County, approximately
2,500 people per month are terminated from General Relief and given
a "sixty day penalty" that prohibits them from reapplying for assist-
ance within two months of termination. The county imposes the "sixty
12. McCain v. Koch, 127 Misc. 2d 23,484 N.Y.S.2d 985 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984) aff'd
as modified, 117 A.D.2d 198, 502 N.Y.S.2d 720 (1986).
13. In Robbins v. Superior Court of Sacramento County, 38 Cal. 3d 199, 695 P.2d
695, 211 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1985), the California Supreme Court enjoined county officials
from utilizing such a mandatory "poorhouse" in Sacramento, California as a means of
controlling general assistance costs.
14. Another lawsuit, Paris v. Board of Supervisors, No. C523361 (Los Angeles
County Super. Ct.), was filed challenging uninhabitable conditions in the voucher ho-
tels. The court issued interim orders requiring inter alia, that homeless persons not be
sent to hotels that do not furnish heat in the winter.
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day penalty" for violation of one of several program rules: being late
for the work project job, failing to turn in a form on time, or failing to
document the required twenty job searches per month. At any given
time, then, nearly 5,000 destitute persons are added to the ranks of the
unassisted homeless in Los Angeles County alone. In defense of its
policy, the Los Angeles Welfare Department argued that eliminating
the sanction would cost approximately $11 million per year. 5 In Ban-
nister v. Board of Supervisors,16 the plaintiff challenged the sixty day
penalty on both procedural and substantive law grounds. The proce-
dural challenge succeeded, at least on paper, leading to regulatory
changes requiring that violations of welfare rules be "willful" before
the welfare department can impose sanctions. The substantive chal-
lenge, based on the proposition that punishment should be somewhat
related to the offense,17 remains in litigation.
Although there is obviously no single "correct" approach or litiga-
tion strategy to deal with the problems of the homeless, there is a test
for a successful litigation strategy. The litigation must have some
chance of success in court, and this success must translate into con-
crete results on the streets. Legal analysis may help lawyers to mea-
sure the first criteria, but only hard, empirical field research can
provide answers to the latter. In order to make scarce resources effec-
tive, attorneys engaged in institutional litigation must develop "mod-
els" of the systems that victimize clients. These models must be
constructed on the basis of objective and accurate information. Most
large bureaucracies maintain extensive management information sys-
tem (MIS) reports that detail statistically the consequences of policy
and program. In order to fully understand a system affecting human
beings, attorneys must leave the office or the law library and spend
time on the streets and in the welfare office waiting rooms, talking to
people and viewing the "system" in its most human terms. It is neces-
sary to have accurate information to guide a litigation strategy. More
importantly, it is necessary to bring the often abstract pursuits of attor-
neys back down, quite literally, to the cold concrete-to face the mis-
eries that mock all pretensions of a just society.
15. Bannister v. Board of Supervisors, No. C535833 (Los Angeles County Super.
Ct. filed Feb. 25, 1985).
16. Id.
17. See Hale v. Morgan, 22 Cal. 3d 388, 584 P.2d 512, 149 Cal. Rptr. 375 (1978).
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